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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the undersigned counsel for appellees represent that the
named parties, Bonnie K. Tingey, LuAnn Christensen, and Barr
Christensen, are and have been the only parties to this litigation.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
(the Honorable Frank G. Noel).
Appellant,

appealed

to

the

Bonnie K. Tingey, the AppellantUtah

Supreme

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Court,

§ 78-2-2 (j).

which

has

The Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, "poured" this appeal "over" to this Court,

This Court

has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §782a-3(2)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OP ISSUES ON REVIEW

Did the District Court correctly conclude and thereby properly
deny Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages based on the facts
that:
a.

There

was

sufficient

evidence

to

support

the

jury

verdict, therefore, the case at bar did not meet the requirements
of Rule 59(a)(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
b.

That the jury verdict was not in violation of law as

required by Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
c.

That the verdict award by the jury was not rendered under

the influence of passion or prejudice as required by Rule 59(a) (5) ,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
d.

That there were no errors in law pursuant Rule 59(a)(7)

of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

1

III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review for each of these
issues

is whether

or not the Trial

Court

clearly

abused

discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial.

its

Jensen

v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197
(Utah 1981)
IV.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE

The Appellant, Bonnie Tingey, was involved in a three car
accident on December 30, 1994. The accident occurred just north of
the

400

South

Defendant,

and

LuAnn

900

East

intersection

Christensen,

was

registered to Barr Christensen.

in

driving

Salt
the

Lake

City.

family

car,

LuAnn had been stopped at the

light at 4 00 South and was northbound in the inside travel lane.
Her attention was momentarily distracted and she looked away, when
her vision returned to directly forward a few seconds later, the
traffic in her lane had stopped.

She applied the brakes but still

struck Susan Fakkema's Subaru, which was knocked forward bumping
the rear bumper of Appellant Bonnie Tingey 1 s vehicle.
was

absolutely

vehicle.

no

Appellant,

visible

Bonnie

damage

Tingey,

filed

to
suit

the
against

There
Tingey
LuAnn

Christensen for damages which she claimed were incurred from the
bump to her vehicle.
Ms.

Tingey

also

Pursuant to §53-3-212, Utah Code Annotated,

filed

suit

against

Barr

Christensen,

LuAnn 1 s

father, as the owner of the Chevrolet Suburban which LuAnn was
driving at the time of the accident.
The Christensens during the course of litigation admitted that
2

the accident was the result of LuAnn Christensen's negligence, but
did not admit that the Appellant's claimed injuries were a result
of this accident.
The issues to be decided by the jury were what injuries, if
any, the Appellant suffered as a result of this accident and if any
injury was incurred as a result of this accident, and the amount of
damages to which Appellant should be entitled, if any.

Further,

whether Appellant suffered any permanent injury as a result of this
accident.
The case was presented for trial from March 11 through March
14, 1996, before a jury, in the courtroom of Third District Court
Judge, Frank Noel.
Appellant put on evidence through witnesses and exhibits in
support of her claim that her injuries were the result of this
minor impact. Appellees presented evidence through their witnesses
and exhibits to support their claim that the Appellant's injuries
were pre-existing and/or arose from causes not related to this
accident.
The District Court refused to give Appellant's proposed
instruction No. 27, which was modeled after a Colorado Jury
Instruction. This instruction was proposed because Ms. Tingey had
been involved in two prior accidents, one of which was quite
severe.

That jury instruction would have required the jury to

apportion Mrs. Tingey's damages between all of the accidents and
any other causes.
did.

Appellees state that is exactly what the jury

If they were unable to apportion it, then it would have
3

required the jury to apportion all damages to this accident,
however the Appellees contend that the jury was able to apportion
the damages between the case at bar and the pre-existing accidents
and/or causes.

The jury determined that the damages that were

sustained as a result of this accident involving LuAnn Christensen
were limited to the amount of the emergency room expenses $1452.92
and One Dollar ($1.00) in general damages.

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in its denial
of Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages.
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

There was
The jury

verdict was not in violation of law. Neither passion nor prejudice
influenced the jury's decision.

There were no errors in law.

Appellant did not meet the burden of proof necessary to
determine that the subject accident was the proximate cause of the
claimed

injuries.

As in most lawsuits, there was testimony

presented by both Appellant and Appellees on both sides of the
injury causation issue.

The jury as trier of fact must weigh the

testimony of each witness and, if they so choose, may totally
discount the testimony of any witness.
There is no question, after marshalling all of the evidence
presented at trial, that the jury could reasonably conclude that
almost all of Appellant's claimed injuries were either pre-existing
and not exacerbated by the accident in question or arose subsequent
to this accident and were the result of events other than this
4

accident.
VI. ARGUMENT
Did the District Court correctly conclude and thereby properly
deny Appellant's Motion for New Trial on Damages based on the
criteria as stated in Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
It is the duty of an appellate court to uphold the verdict of
the trial court if the verdict is within the bounds of reason and
is supported by sufficient evidence.

As stated in Boden v.

Suhmann. 327 P.2d 826, 8 Utah 2d 42, (Utah 1958)
We affirm the responsibility of this court to be
indulgent toward the verdict of the jury, and not to
disturb it so long as it is within the bounds of reason,
in accordance with the principles set forth in the
companion case of Schneider v. Suhrmann; (FN11) and also
that it is primarily the prerogative and the duty of the
trial court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict and
to
order
any
necessary
modification
thereof.
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the limits of
any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the
evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if the
trial court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to make
the correction on appeal. (FN12)
In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence to support
the verdict, and therefore the verdict should be upheld since it is
within the bounds of reason.

Appellant claims that a District

Court can and should be reversed for failure to grant a new trial
in circumstances where the jury award is so small, in light of the
evidence presented, as to be plainly unreasonable or unjust.
However, this verdict was very much within reason and therefore not
unreasonable nor unjust.

In Moser v. Zions Co-op Merc. Inst, 114

Utah 58, 65, 197 P.2d 136 (1948), it is stated that:
If reasonable minds could have found as the jury did from
the evidence before it, then this court cannot say that
5

the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
party's motion for new trial on the grounds of
insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict.

Numerous witnesses were presented by the Appellant,

However,

there were sections in each of these witness's testimony that did
not support the claims made by Appellant.
Appellant's

own

accident

reconstruction

expert,

Ronald

Probert, stated that the rear bumper cover of the Tingey vehicle
had to be removed to observe any damage.

That damage was a slight

indentation in the styrofoam bumper core. Further, that the damage
to the bumper was so slight, there wasn't enough damage such that
he could measure anything. Tr.000396

Additionally, he could not

tell whether this slight indentation in the styrofoam core came
from this accident or her rear end accident that occurred in 1989
in the same vehicle, since o repairs were made to the vehicle
following the 1989 accident.
Appellee

Tr. 000396-7

LuAnn Christensen

testified

that

she exited

her

vehicle at the scene to check with Susan Fakkema, regarding her
injuries, but was unaware of the involvement of a third vehicle,
even at that time.

It was not until they were filling out the

police reports, that she was made aware that the Appellant's car
had even been involved in the accident.

Until that time, she

believed that only the Fakkema vehicle and herself were involved.
Tr. 000380 .
Oral Surgeon
stated

in

open

for the Appellant, Dr. Blaine Donald Austin

court

when

ask
6

about

temporomandibular

joint

injuries (TMJ), one of Appellant's primary complaints, that this
ligamentous damage can be caused by long term stress as well as
trauma. Tr.000471

Tr.000499. He further testified that there are

discussions in the academic world that whiplash is not one of the
mechanisms that can cause TMJ problems. Tr.000498 Some of the most
recent

literature

according

to

Appellants

own

oral

surgeon

indicates that there can be an accumulation of small injuries over
a period of time, people getting hit with things which accumulate
over time and then it (TMJ) will manifest itself somewhere along
the way. Appellant did not consult with Dr. Austin until 4 months
following the accident, it was noted that his assessment that the
TMJ problem was from this accident was strictly from her account.
Witness for the Defense, Crayton Walker, D.D.S., M.D. testified
that in his opinion, " I doubt that the accident of December of
1993 significantly contributed to her TMJ, because it was just such
a low impact. The forces involved I doubt would cause the problem.
In addition, I think that her problem was exaggerated by her
psychological profile, her stress and strain in her life, and I
think that there is a good chance that she can grind and clench her
teeth.

Patients could never have had an automobile accident and

have he psychological profile and have the same findings on her TMJ
as what Bonnie Tingey had." Tr* 000695.

Further, Appellees' Bio-

mechical expert, Scott McClellan, testified regarding the Temporomandibular joint injury that Ms. Tingey's daily activities of
chewing and yawning put significantly more force on her Temporo
mandibular joint than the forces in the accident. Tr.000825.
7

It was made known to the jury during examination of witnesses,
that Appellant had been involved in a number of other accidents
prior to this accident.

Further, that some of these accidents were

severe, and that she was in treatment at the time of this accident.
Tr. 000504

In fact she had been referred

to the

University

Hospital Pain Clinic in November of 1993, a month before this
accident. Tr.000516
pain Tr.000539.

This referral was for the treatment of chronic
Chronic pain which

accident. Tr. 000543

existed

long before

this

This pain had been ongoing since the accident

that occurred in October of 1990, more than three years before this
accident.

Tr.000553

The

Appellant

in

describing

her

pain

approximately three weeks prior to this accident described it as
agonizing, pounding, torturing, wrenching, excruciating, tender,
frightful, discomforting. Tr. 000572
The

physician

for

the

Appellant's

foot,

James

Gillis

Maclntyre, M.D., testified that it was four months from the date of
the

accident

Appellant's

until
foot.

the

time

Further,

that

he was

consulted

he

testified

that

it

regarding
was

his

understanding that this was the first time she had consulted or saw
anyone regarding her foot pain. Tr.000457. In February 1994, two
months following this accident,

when Appellant filled out her

questionnaire for the University Hospital Pain Clinic, she did not
reference any injury to her foot.Tr. 000794

As part of her Pain

Clinic questionnaire in February 1994, Bonnie Tingey reported that
she was able to walk three miles a day.

If her foot had been

injured in the accident, that would not have been possible.
8

Dr Maclntyre's entire knowledge that her foot pain was related
to the accident, came from Appellant's comments to him.

Tr.000457

Further, testimony was presented by the bio-mechanical expert,
Scott McClellan, that a rear impact probably would not create a
subluxation injury to the foot since it required a forward forcing
motion and a rear collision forced the body to move backward not
forward. Tr.000830
In regards to Appellant's alleged loss of household services,
Economist, Alan Stephens, testified that he was instructed by the
Appellant to simply lay out the numbers and let the jury conclude,
which part was related to which accident. Tr.000634.
precisely what the jury did.

That is

The jury found that no loss of

household services was related to this accident.
Appellant attempts to show that the low jury verdict was not
supported by the evidence, therefore, it must have been the product
of passion and prejudice.

On the contrary, the low verdict was

supported by the evidence.
The mere fact that the verdict in the mind of Appellant's
counsel was small by itself, is not sufficient to indicate passion
or prejudice without additional factors. In this case there are no
additional factors.

In Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d

123 (Utah 1974) it is stated that:
. . . We can discover nothing in this case,
except the amount of the verdict, which
indicates passion or prejudice, and, as we
have seen, passion and prejudice are not
necessarily
inferred
from
an
excessive
verdict, without more. No exception was taken
to the jury or any member thereof. No conduct
on the part of the jury, evincing passion and
9

prejudice, has been called to our attention.
The only point of complaint is the size of
verdict.
Passion and prejudice is usually reserved for cases in which
the jury has awarded an amount in excess of what would be expected.
There

could

a variety

of

reasons why

a jury might

excessive amount after being inflamed or prejudiced.

award

an

However, in

the case at bar, the only fact that Appellant relies upon for the
passion and prejudice is that Court allowed the disclosure of the
fact that the Appellant's husband is an attorney.

This disclosure

alone not sufficient to show passion or prejudice by the jury, such
that they would have disregarded their duty in making their award
of damages.
In Brunson v. Young, 412 P.2d 451, 17 Utah 2d 364 (Utah 1966)
the Court stated that:
When both sides have been given an opportunity
to present their evidence and contentions to
jury, and verdict has been rendered, all
presumptions must support its validity and it
must stand unless appellant shows that error
was committed which had such an adverse effect
upon trial that there is reasonable likelihood
that result would have been different in its
absence.
There was no other evidence presented that might have aroused
passion or prejudice causing the jury to award the Appellant a very
small amount.

In the case at bar the Appellant did not meet the

burden of proof, and the jury was not convinced that the injuries
claimed were sustained as a result of this accident, nor did they
believe that she should be compensated for her alleged loss of
10

household services, which she could not prove. Further, Appellant
testified that in filling out a document to describe her condition
25 days before this accident, she recorded that she could only do
50% of her household work. Tr.000804. Appellant also admitted to
failing to disclose all of her prior accidents at the time of her
deposition. Tr.000800-801.

A fact that may have very possible

affecting her credibility.
Appellant would like you to believe that the proof of both the
injuries and the economic loss arising from this accident was
overwhelming.

It was not, and the Appellant has not claimed that

any new evidence to substantiate her claimed losses has surfaced.
The jury in the subject case was ask by the Appellant to believe
that this secondary impact to her vehicle, which did not even cause
any visible damage to Appellant's vehicle, caused over $33,000 in
medical expenses and caused Appellant to be so incapacitated that
she could not perform her household chores.

However, Appellant

testified that prior to this accident she was experiencing pain
which she described as stabbing, splitting, agonizing, pounding,
torturing pain in the neck and head, and constant, killing and
excruciating pain in the shoulders and back. Tr.000803-805
The Appellant simply failed to prove her case that her
injuries and problems were a result of this accident.
Finally, there were 37 instructions presented to the jury.
Instruction No. 23 notes the amount of reasonable value of health
care services and supplies that had been stipulated as to have in
fact been incurred, and left it to the jury to determine whether
11

they were sustained as a result of this accident or not. The jury
concluded that $1459.92 of the medical specials were a result of
this accident.

Instruction No. 24 addresses Appellant's future

loss of household

services and earning

capacity

as well as

projected future health care costs. The jury determined that there
were no future loss of household services or future heath care
costs as a result of this accident. Instruction No. 2 6 and 27 are
Utah Jury Instruction which address pre-existing conditions and
awards for those conditions.

Appellant argues that his Colorado

Jury instruction, if it had been allowed, would have changed the
outcome of the award. We adamantly disagree. The jury was able to
distinguish between each of Appellant's accidents and made the
determination that the majority of the damages claimed were not a
result of this accident.
CONCLUSION
The Jury appropriately awarded Appellant Special damages for
expenses incurred the day of the accident, and nothing more.
The jury
damages.

initially

did not award Appellant

any general

However following the Court's instruction that because

they had awarded some special damages, that they were required to
award something in the way of general damages even though it may be
nominal, they awarded Appellant the nominal amount of $1.00 in
general damages. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict. The verdict was not rendered under the influence of
passion or prejudice.

It was not in violation of the law nor were

there any errors in law. This verdict was a just and fair verdict.
12

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of

1997.
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At/corney for Appellees
Barr and LuAnn Christensen
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the_
day of August, 1997, I
caused to served two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLEE'S LuANN AND BARR CHRISTENSEN by method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Peter C. Collins
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, LC
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL

c^

13

